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THE GAMBLING ON INTERNET – A TRUE 
CHALLENGE FOR FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS
by
MICHAL KOŠČÍK*
The article focuses on the European case law on-line gambling and gambling in  
general. The case law is notable due to the clashes of fundamental freedoms of com-
mon market, namely freedom to provide services and freedom of establishment, and  
fundamental interests of member states, namely moral, religious or ethical values,  
protection of consumers, prevention from crime and more importantly the consider-
able income for state from taxation of gambling. The Court of Justice was tradition-
ally reluctant to intervene in national legislation where the moral and ethical val-
ues were involved. However in the last decade, the court was forced to narrow pos-
sibilities to  justify such restrictions to  fundamental  freedoms when the  member  
states started to abuse this benevolent approach in order to disguise protectionist  
measures  which aimed to prevent online-gambling companies  from entering na-
tional markets.  The article contains the analysis of C-275/92 Her Majesty's Cus-
toms and Excise v.  Schindler,  Case no C-124/97 Markku  Johani,  Case C-67/98  
Zenatti,  C-243/01  Piergiorgio  Gambelli  Joint  cases  C-338/04,  C-359/04  and  
C-360/04 Placanica and others.
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1. INTRODUCTION
It seems that it is fate of Gambling industry to be accompanied by contro-
versy, caused by its reputation of industry damaging both individuals and 
societies. Pressure of public opinion together with grave impact on states' 
fiscal policies makes it difficult for any government to leave gambling sector 
without  regulation.  The right to regulate gambling industry results  from 
sovereignty of each state and this sovereignty can be restricted only by an 
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act of the state, e.g. in the form of international treaty or supranational body 
such as the EU.
Since there is no European harmonization of the Gambling issues, the 
aim of this paper is to analyze the case-law of ECJ that addressed the colli-
sion between interests of individual states and fundamental freedoms given 
by the EC Treaty. The 'leitmotiv' of these cases is a question whether the law 
of European Union puts any restrictions on the right of its member states to 
regulate their Gambling industries, and if yes, to what extent is the sover-
eignty of member states restricted. This paper will focus on leading cases to 
describe the current status quo of gambling industry's regulation in Europe.
2. THE NEED FOR REGULATION
Before I start with a legal analysis of the conflict between national regula-
tion and common market principles, it can be useful to point out what are 
the main driving factors for gambling regulation at the level of  member 
states. There are several factors which lead governments to put gambling 
activities under regulation.
The most  frequently  mentioned arguments  for  the  regulation  are  ad-
verse effects of gambling addiction on individuals and subsequently on 
the whole society. The negative effects on society can be illustrated by ana-
lysis of all possible “social costs” of gambling, by D. Walker. He reached the 
conclusion that costs of gambling are shared between individual gambler 
(income lost from missed work, decreased productivity on the job, depression and  
physical illness related to stress, increased suicide attempts) and society (bailout  
costs, unrecovered loans to pathological gamblers, unpaid debts and bankruptcies,  
higher insurance premiums resulting from pathological gambler-caused fraud, cor-
ruption of public officials, strain on public services, industry cannibalization).1
Secondly, there might exist moral, religious or ethical values which may 
be inconsistent with certain forms of gambling or against gambling itself. 
These  values  may  be  different  in  each  member  state.  Moreover,  the 
gambling activities are frequently accompanied by high risk of fraud e.g. 
manipulated  results  of  sports  events.  Gambling  also  creates  a  potential 
space for money laundering, the regulation of gambling may therefore be 
necessary to combat other criminal activities.
The  fact  that  the  gambling  industry  also  contributes  significantly  to 
state income is of a massive importance for governments. States tend to cre-
ate controlled monopolies in various gambling fields (most typically lotter-
ies)  and use income from gambling for various purposes. As will  be de-
1 See Walker. D. The Economics of Casino Gambling, Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2007 ISBN 
978-3-540-35102-3
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scribed  below,  the  question  of  regulation  motivated  fully  or  partly  by 
budget reasons became one of the key legal issues of case-law on gambling.
As a result of these factors, the regulation of national gambling indus-
tries tends to hinder the access of foreign gambling companies to national 
markets. This gives rise to plenty of objections which claim incompatibility 
with fundamental principles of common market, especially with freedom to 
provide services, freedom of establishment and eventually free movement 
of goods. These objections puts challenge to both national and community 
courts, which are to rule on compatibility or incompatibility of such regula-
tions with the law of EU.
3. EARLY ECJ CASE LAW ON GAMBLING
The “early” case law on gambling in Europe was formed by the cases of 
Schindler,  Lārā, and  Zanneti. These cases appeared throughout the nineties 
which could be characterized as a period when the ECJ was rather reluctant 
to interfere with these sensitive issues. The early case law on gambling will 
be addressed only briefly, since it does not contain the element of internet 
and have been sufficiently analyzed by other authors.
3.1. SCHINDLER
Schindler case2 wasn't only a landmark case for the regulation of gambling, 
it can be considered as one of the leading cases in the area of free movement 
of services. This case dealt with attempt of German loterry's agents to pro-
mote lottery and sell their lottery tickets in Great Britain, where at that time, 
lotteries  were  prohibited.  European  court  of  justice  acknowledged  that 
gambling is an economic activity and it also stated that sale of lottery tickets 
relates to free movement of services3 rather than to free movement of goods. 
The prohibition of lotteries in the UK therefore constituted a restriction to 
free movement of services, however the court recognized that the purpose 
of this restriction is “preserving the maintenance of order in society”4 and 
can be  therefore justified as  so called mandatory requirement,5 provided 
that such restriction is non-discriminatory.
2 C-275/92 Her Majesty's Customs and Excise v. Schindler
3 Ibid. Para. 37
4 Ibid. Para. 58
5 justify national authorities having a sufficient degree of latitude to determine what is required to 
protect the players and, more generally, in the light of the specific social and cultural features of each 
Member State, to maintain order in society, as regards the manner in which lotteries are operated,  
the size of the stakes, and the allocation of the profits they yield. In those circumstances, it is for them  
to assess not only whether it is necessary to restrict the activities of lotteries but also whether they  
should be prohibited, provided that those restrictions are not discriminatory
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3.2. LĀRĀ
Lārā case6 involved  Finnish  regulation  on  slot  machines,  which  did  not 
completely prohibit them, but subjected them to a strict regulation. Under 
this regulation, the running of the slot machines were reserved to a public 
institution. The court in this case recognized that “in so far as such legislation  
involves no discrimination on grounds of nationality, that impediment may be jus-
tified on grounds relating to the protection of consumers and the mainten-
ance of order in society.”7 The court further examined the proportionality of 
Finnish regulation, but scholars perceive its approach in this case to be a 
”remarkedly hands-off approach”8 as opposed to strict proportionality test 
used  in  Schindler.  The  court  held  that  member  states  have  discretion  to 
choose a measure to achieve the pursued objective, which in this case meant 
that Finland could choose restriction of gambling by means of state mono-
poly instead of prohibition as could be seen in Schindler case.
3.3. ZENATTI
Zenatti case9 might not belong to most important cases of the substantive 
law of the EU, however it had direct impact on Italian legislation and pre-
ceded Gambelli.  Similarly to Gambelli case, Zenatti involved Italian regula-
tion of gambling. Like in Lārā, Italian government restricted gambling in-
dustry by creating a state controlled institution which held the monopoly 
on sport-betting. The court confirmed that Italy had the right to partially 
prohibit gambling for justifiable purposes, such as social policy. It is import-
ant to mention, that the court analyzed provisions of Italian law only in the 
light of their compatibility with provisions on free movement of services, 
since preliminary question referred to ECJ did not cover freedom of estab-
lishment.10
4. THE ITALIAN SAGA – GAMBELLI AND PLACANICA
4.1. GAMBELLI
The case of Piergiorgio Gambelli and others involved criminal prosecution 
of Italian entrepreneurs who were contracted to UK company Stanley Inter-
national Betting Ltd, which is the fourth biggest bookmaker and the largest 
6 Case no  C-124/97
7 Ibid. Second paragraph of case summary
8 Paraphrase Barnard, Catherine The substantive law of EU, 2007, Oxford university press 
p. 381
9 Case C-67/98 Zenatti
10 See para. 74 of OPINION OF advocate GENERAL ALBER delivered on 13 March 2003 (1) 
Case C-243/01
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casino operator in the United Kingdom.11 In this business model the con-
tracted entrepreneurs served as intermediaries between Italian customers 
and British betting company, by processing bets and collecting money from 
Italian customers and subsequently communicating these bets to Stanley via 
Internet.  Italian  law prohibited,  under  criminal  sanctions,  to  organize  or 
carry on betting without a licence issued by Italian state authorities, while 
the maximum possible amount of betting licences' holders was limited to 
1000. Mr. Gambelli and other entrepreneurs owned licences for processing 
data, but did not have licences for providing betting services. Entrepreneurs 
were thus charged by Italian authorities with “Unlawful participation in the 
organization of games or bets”. The defendants brought an action for re-
view before the Italian court, which referred to the European court of Justice 
for a preliminary ruling regarding compatibility of Italian legislation with 
law of European communities.
The  question  of  Italian  court  focused  on  national  law's  compatibility 
with two fundamental freedoms of common market, namely the freedom of 
establishment and the freedom to provide services (Art 43 et seq treaty).12 
This subchapter will therefore analyze these legal issues rosed by the na-
tional court.
4.1.1. RESTRICTION ON THE FREEDOM OF ESTABLISHMENT
Article 49 of Treaty on the functioning of the European Union grants nation-
als of any member state the right to set up agencies, branches or subsidiar-
ies in any other member states. Mr. Gambelli and representatives of Stanley 
claimed that Italy was denying this right by excluding certain types of com-
panies (companies with liability limited by shares), restricting the amount 
of licences to relatively low number and granting them under conditions 
which  could  in  practice  be  met  only  by  those  bookmakers  which  had 
already been participating  in  Italian betting  system.13 Italian government 
did not in fact refute allegations that its licensing system created restrictions 
11 Joint cases -338/04, C-359/04 and C-360/04 Placanica and others - para 20.
12 The exact wording of the question referred for the decision is as follows: 'Is there incompatib-
ility (with the repercussions that that has in Italian law) between Articles 43 et seq. and Article 49 et  
seq. of the EC Treaty regarding freedom of establishment and freedom to provide cross-border ser-
vices, on the one hand, and on the other domestic legislation such as the provisions contained in Art-
icle 4(1) et seq., Article 4a and Article 4b of Italian Law No 401/89 (as most recently amended by  
Article 37(5) of Law No 388/00 of 23 December 2000) which prohibits on pain of criminal penalties  
the pursuit by any person anywhere of the activities of collecting, taking, booking and forwarding of-
fers of bets, in particular bets on sporting events, unless the requirements concerning concessions 
and authorisations prescribed by domestic law have been complied with?' See para. 23.
13 See para. 25  and para. 33 of OPINION OF advocate GENERAL ALBER delivered on 13 
March 2003 (1) Case C-243/01 Criminal proceedings against Piergiorgio Gambelli and Oth-
ers
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to  freedom  of  establishment  and  relied  more  on  justification  of  their 
schemes.
Even though neither side of the case, nor any interested party nor advoc-
ate general disputed the claim that the national legislation imposes restric-
tion on freedom of establishment, an interesting point was raised by Com-
mission which held the opinion that it is not appropriate to address this is-
sue in light of freedom of establishment because of the fact that “the agencies  
managed by Mr Gambelli are technically independent and are not subordinate to  
Stanley”14 and that it would be therefore more appropriate to consider this 
issue in light of freedom to provide services.15 However this objection dealt 
with  concrete  situation  of  concerned  parties.  Because  the  task  of  the 
European court of Justice was to answer more general question on compat-
ibility of Italian law with the articles 43 et seq. of the former EC treaty, the 
objection of European commission will be set aside in this chapter and ana-
lyzed in a different part of this paper.
As to the question whether Italian government created a restriction to 
freedom of establishment,  the  court  unsurprisingly  reached a  conclusion 
that Italian legislation on betting constituted such restriction.16 The court 
noted that any restriction on the activities of agencies such as defendants in the  
main proceedings constitute such obstacle.17 The restrictions in this individual 
case  vested in  the  fact  that  Italian  regulation made  it  impossible  to  run 
gambling business for capital companies.
4.1.2. RESTRICTIONS TO FREE MOVEMENT OF SERVICES
The European court of justice has been sticking to the legal opinion that 
gambling is considered as a service since its decision in Schindler and Gam-
belli case is no exemption from this established doctrine. With reference to 
Schindler, the court merely stated that the activity of enabling nationals of one  
Member State to engage in betting activities organized in another Member State,  
even if they concern sporting events taking place in the first Member State, relates  
to a 'service' within the meaning of Article 50 EC.18 The fact that the services are 
rendered from distance via Internet had no real impact on the legal qualific-
ation of the situation of Stanley's activities as a service.19
14 Ibid. Para 57
15 As was noted by ECJ in Gebhard, articles 39,43, and 49 are “mutually exclusive” - see Barn-
ard, Catherine The substantive law of EU, 2007, Oxford university press  p252
16 See para 59. of C-243/01 Piergiorgio Gambelli
17 See para. 44. of C-243/01 Piergiorgio Gambelli
18 Ibid. Para 52
19 Ibid para 53 and 54. In para 54, the court expressly referred to C-384/93 Alpine Investments 
where ECJ reached a conclusion that article 49 covers also services which provider offers by 
telephone to potential recipients without moving from the member state in which he is es-
tablished
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After  the court  made it  clear  that  service  is  involved in  the case,  the 
second logical step was to find out whether the freedom to provide services 
is restricted by Italian measures. The Italian government confirmed that ac-
cording to Italian law, an individual in Italy who from his home connects by in-
ternet to a bookmaker established in another Member State using his credit card to  
pay is committing an offense.20 The court did not need to use any complicated 
reasoning to rule that provision which prohibits  customers to use certain 
service from foreign entrepreneurs creates restriction of freedom to provide 
services.21 Moreover, according to the opinion of the court, the restriction of 
freedom to provide services vested also in criminal penalties for companies 
which served as intermediaries of gambling services, such as Gambelli.
4.1.3. JUSTIFICATION FOR RESTRICTION OF FREEDOM
OF ESTABLISHMENT AND FREE MOVEMENT OF SERVICES
In the Zenatti case the court stated that Italian government could justify re-
striction of free movement of services on the basis of protecting society from 
negative effects of gambling. The most significant difference between regu-
lation of gambling in Zenatti and other aforementioned gambling cases22 is 
that the true purpose of restrictions in Italian contemporary legislation was 
not only the protection of customers and prevention from fraud and money 
laundering, but also to protect national private undertakings as it was ap-
parent from the working papers relating to the disputed provisions of na-
tional law.23
The  element  of  blatant  protectionism  meant  a  new  challenge  for  the 
court of justice, which had previously tended to give member states a signi-
ficant  amount of discretion when regulating their gambling industry. On 
the  one hand,  ECJ  is  generally  hesitant  to  intervene in  the  discretion  of 
Member states in cases involving morale, public order or human rights. On 
the other hand, ECJ had promoted itself,  mainly by its own case-law in-
volving direct  effect  of  EC law, to the role of protector  of  entrepreneurs 
from state protectionism. Therefore if  the court overlooked Italian protec-
tionist  measures,  he  would undermine  the  predictability  of  his  own de-
cisions and thereby also the legal certainty in the European law. With these 
two contradicting tendencies in mind, the court had to decide whether the 
20 Ibid para 56
21 It is important to note that such restriction creates restriction of freedom of establishment as 
well
22 Schindler, Lara, Zenatti
23 See para. 19 of
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restriction contained in Italian measures can be justified or exempted from 
the scope of EC treaty via former articles 45 or 46 of EC treaty.24
The court refused to apply articles 45 or 46 of the Treaty with reference 
to its earlier case law. The court did not go very deep with reasoning why 
he didn't apply these provisions; this was probably caused by the fact that, 
apart from Greece, none of the concerned or interested parties used these 
articles in its opinions.  Even if one of these articles applied it would not 
provide court with final solution since the exemptions contained in them re-
late only to freedom of establishment and not freedom to provide services.
After it was clear that exemptions under articles 45 and 46 of the treaty 
would not apply, it was necessary to analyze, whether the restrictions could 
be justified as imperative requirements. As European court of justice previ-
ously ruled in Gebhard25 certain restrictions on fundamental freedoms can 
be justified in case following four conditions are met: 
• they must be applied in a non-discriminatory manner
• they must be justified by imperative requirements in the general 
interest
• they must be suitable for securing the attainment of the objective 
which they pursue
• they must not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it.26
These four conditions were met in previous gambling cases, however it was 
indeed questionable whether these conditions were also met in the regula-
tion disputed in Gambelli.
The legal analysis on whether Italy meets these requirements was bril-
liantly construed by  Advocate general. In his opinion he hinted, that Italian 
regulation failed to meet conditions of Gebhard. First, he considered Italian 
procedure  of  awarding  licences  discriminatory  in  nature  since  it  clearly 
favored  entrepreneurs  with  previous  experience,  and  required  business 
premises on Italian territory. This made it practically impossible for foreign 
“newcomers” to obtain concessions to organize betting . Second, he ques-
tioned the suitability27 and proportionality28 of provisions which prevent ac-
cess of share companies to Italian betting market. In the end, advocate gen-
24 Currently articles 50 and 51 of the treaty
25 C-55/94 Gebhard [1995] ECR I-4165
26 Ibid. Para. 37
27 See para. 98 of Opinion- “The question nevertheless arises whether the specific exclusion of 
companies limited by shares is capable of serving that objective”
28 See  para 99 of Opinion “The complete refusal of access seems in any event to be dispropor-
tionate.”
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eral questioned also the imperative requirements which were relied on by 
Italian government.
Advocate general held the opinion that the regulation of gambling in 
other member states provides sufficient protection from eventual harm and 
therefore Italian authorities go beyond what is necessary when they require 
any extra regulations of once regulated businesses.29 What is more Italian 
government did not really attempt to prevent passion for gambling, it was 
in fact extending the opportunities for it by law. The final, and in my view 
also  the most important argument, in the reasoning of advocate general 
was that prevailing purpose of Italian regulation is protection of its own 
tax revenues,30 and therefore this  regulation cannot be justified by argu-
ments of protection of customers or social policy. Indeed the court  ruled in 
the Zenatti31 that  the financing of social activities through a levy on the pro-
ceeds of  authorized games [may constitute]  only an incidental  beneficial 
consequence and not the real justification for the restrictive policy adopted32 
Advocate general also suggested, that the court should abandon his doc-
trine on letting member states' courts to decide on justification of measures 
which restrict gambling and in this case rule on the incompatibility of Itali-
an law directly. Had the court fully followed the opinion of advocate gener-
al, the ruling of the case would be
The provisions of Article 49 et seq. EC concerning the freedom to provide  
services are to be interpreted as precluding national legislation like the Itali-
an legislation contained in Article 4(1) to (4), 4a and 4b of Law No 401 of  
13 December 1989 (as most recently amended by Article 37(5) of Law No 
388 of 23 December 2000), which provides for prohibitions enforced by crim-
inal penalties on the activities of collecting, taking, booking and forwarding  
offers of bets, in particular bets on sporting events, where such activities are  
effected by, on the premises of, or on behalf of, a bookmaker which is estab-
lished in another Member State and which duly carries out those activities  
in accordance with the legislation applicable in that State.
However, as will be described below, the court approached the case more 
carefully, and let national court to decide on justifiability of national meas-
ures under certain conditions. I would say, that such approach was rather 
29 Ibid. Para 118.
30 In paragraph 127 of his opinion advocate general expressly said that: “it is clear from the 
submissions of the Member States that what they fear most is the economic consequences of 
changes within the gambling sector. Little reference is made in this context to any danger-
ous effects that gambling might have on gamblers and their social environment.”
31 Case C-67/98 Zenatti
32 Case C-67/98 Zenatti  para 36 - as mentioned in para 125 of attorney general.
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counter-productive, since as the development in Italy later showed, the re-
fusal to decide on compatibility with EC treaty only slowed the process of 
abolishing incompatible national law. For the defense of the ECJ can be said, 
that it could not foresee that the loopholes in the case law will be exploited 
in Italy and that at that a strict ruling would be strongly inconsistent with 
rather benevolent approach in previous gambling cases.
As was mentioned above, the court has ruled that Italian legislation cre-
ates a restriction to free movement of services and to freedom of establish-
ment, but did not make a final decision in the question whether such restric-
tion is justified. The court noted without any explanation, nevertheless in 
accordance with previous case law, that it is for the national court to determine  
whether the national legislation, taking account of the detailed rules for its applica-
tion, actually serves the aims which might justify it, and whether the restrictions it  
imposes are disproportionate in the light of those aims33 The wording of the rul-
ing of the court is therefore as follows:
National legislation which prohibits on pain of criminal penalties the pur-
suit of the activities of collecting, taking, booking and forwarding offers of  
bets, in particular bets on sporting events, without a licence or authorization  
from the Member State concerned constitutes a restriction on the freedom of  
establishment and the freedom to provide services provided for in Articles 43  
and 49 EC respectively. It is for the national court to determine whether  
such legislation, taking account of the detailed rules for its application, actu-
ally serves the aims which might justify it, and whether the restrictions it  
imposes are disproportionate in the light of those objectives.
It may appear that the European court of justice avoided the question and 
returned the case to national court with little help, however the progress in 
comparison to previous gambling case is evident. In its reasoning, the ECJ 
gave Italian court clear guidelines on what can be considered justifiable so 
that it would be quite difficult for Italian court to “get lost”.
First of these criteria is  the existence of general interest such as public 
order  which  may  justify  restrictions.  Important  conclusion  made  by  the 
court is, that In so far as the authorities of a Member State incite and encourage  
consumers to participate in lotteries, games of chance and betting to the financial  
benefit of the public purse, the authorities of that State cannot invoke public order  
concerns34.  Second condition  is  that  the  Italian  rules  must  be  applicable 
without distinction between Italian and foreign providers. Third condition 
33 C-243/01 Criminal proceedings against Piergiorgio Gambelli, para 76
34 Ibid. Para 69
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was that the measure must be suitable in for achieving objectives of pro-
tecting the general interest,  which in the individual  case meant that  they  
must serve to limit betting activities in a consistent and systematic manner35. Final 
condition is proportionality. ECJ set forth that Italian court must examine 
whether the restrictions must not go beyond what is necessary to combat 
fraud.
4.2. JOINED CASES C-338/04, C-359/04
AND C-360/04 PLACANICA AND OTHERS
Placanica case originates in the controversial application of Gambelli case by 
Italian supreme court. Its factual background is therefore very similar to the 
case of Gambelli. Like Gambelli, it involves Stanley International Betting Ltd 
which kept leading its legal battle for the right to access Italian market. The 
case  also  involved  criminal  prosecution  of  entrepreneurs36 who,  like  Mr 
Gambelli, run data centers which served as intermediaries between Stanley 
company and customers. The Italian regulation on gambling remained sim-
ilar to regulation in the times of Gambelli. It still preserved a system of lim-
ited number of licences awarded by state institution and sanctioned those 
who organized betting without them. The significant change in Italian regu-
lation since Gambelli was the fact that the licences were awarded by inde-
pendent state institution instead on Italian olympic committee (CONI) and 
the fact that all kind of companies (including capital companies which were 
previously prevented) were allowed to apply for licences. However, despite 
allowing  capital companies to apply for the licence,  Italy did not revoke 
the licences awarded under previous system, and thus did not leave virtu-
ally any space for companies to participate in Italian gambling market for 
upcoming years.
Italian supreme administrative court, had a chance to apply the test of 
justifiability set forth in Gambelli in a very similar case of Gesualdi, approx-
imately one year after the decision in Gambelli. The Italian court surprisingly 
found, that restrictions posed by Italian national law are justified due to the 
public order and safety37. The court pointed out that the system of authoriz-
ations which was established in order to combat involvement in crime, such 
as fraud,  money-laundering and racketeering and did not  create distinct 
treatment between national and foreign companies,  since it had the effect of  
excluding not only the foreign companies whose  shareholders cannot be precisely  
35 Ibid. Para 67
36 under article 4(4a) of Law No 401/89
37 See opinion of advocate general on case Placanica
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identified, but also all the Italian companies whose shareholders cannot be precisely  
identified.38
It  however  appears,  that  lower-instance  Italian  courts  were  not  com-
pletely persuaded by the reasoning of the court in Gesualdi case, since two 
of them asked for preliminary rulings in cases almost identical to  Gambelli 
or  Gesualdi. Both of them questioned the Italian legislation “approved” by 
Corte suprema di cassazione and one of them even expressly questioned the 
decision in Gesualdi.
First of these 'rebelling' courts was Tribunale di Larino, which was to de-
cide on a criminal case, where Mr. Placanica was charged by committing a 
crime of collecting bets without required authorization.  The judge was un-
sure about the compatibility of the status quo of Italian application practice 
and decision of Gesualdi  with community law, so it  stopped the case and 
asked the European court of justice to make a preliminary ruling on question:
'Does the Court of Justice consider Article 4(4a) of Law No 401/89 to be  
compatible with the principles enshrined in Article 43 [EC] et seq. and 49  
[EC] concerning the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide  
cross-border services, having regard to the difference between the interpreta-
tion emerging from the decisions of the Court ... (in particular the judgment  
in  Gambelli  and Others)  and the  decision of  the  Corte  Suprema di  Cas-
sazione, Sezione Uniti, in Case No 23271/04? In particular, the Court is re-
quested to rule on the applicability in Italy of the rules on penalties referred  
to in the indictment and relied upon against [Mr] Placanica.'
Tribunale  di  Teramo who was dealing  with similar  case  questioned that 
Italian regulation did not abolish licences that were awarded in a previous 
licensing scheme. The Tribunale di Teramo pointed out that previous licens-
ing  scheme  was  discriminatory  towards  capital  companies,  and  even 
though it was not discriminatory at the time of the decision, the fact that li-
cences awarded under previous scheme remained valid constituted tempor-
ary derogation of right to provide services for capital companies because 
they could apply  for  licences  only  after  expiration  of  existing  ones.  The 
court therefore asked whether first paragraph of the former Article 43 EC 
and the first paragraph of Article 49 EC may be interpreted as
1. allowing the Member States to derogate temporarily (for 6 to 12 years)  
from the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services within  
the European Union, and to
38 See para 17 of Placanica
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2. allocate to certain persons licences for the pursuit of certain activities in-
volving provision of services, valid for 6 or 12 years, on the basis of a body of  
rules which excluded from the tender procedure certain kinds of (non-Itali-
an) competitors; then amending that system, after subsequently noting that  
it was not compatible with the principles enshrined in Articles 43 [EC] and  
49 [EC], and
3. not to revoke the licences granted on the basis of the earlier system which,  
infringed the principles of freedom of establishment and of free movement of  
services; and
4. .... to bring criminal proceedings against anyone carrying on business via  
a link with operators who, [despite] being entitled to pursue such an activity  
in the Member State of origin, were nevertheless unable to seek an operating  
licence precisely because of the restrictions contained in the earlier licensing  
rules?'39
Since these cases had similar factual background and since they were open-
ing the same legal issues the court decided to deal with them jointly.
Comparing to the questions laid by Italian court in Gambelli, questions 
in Placanica are much more detailed and instead of asking generally, they 
are focused on the application of national law by national authorities and 
courts.40
4.2.1. BARRIERS TO FREE MOVEMENT OF SERVICES,
FREEDOM OF ESTABLISHMENT AND THEIR JUSTIFIABILITY
The  question  whether  regulation  of  gambling  industry  which  limits  the 
number of possible  providers of services, such as those introduced by Itali-
an government, creates obstacle for freedom to provide services or freedom 
of establishment had been already answered in Gambelli together with the 
question of justifiability of such restrictions. In Placanica the European court 
of justice merely repeated its conclusions from Gambelli, and then further 
developed these conclusions41 with regard to the individual elements of the 
39 The quotation of preliminary question is shortened due to better comprehensibility and due 
to space reasons.
40 Here has to be noted that the wording of the referred questions (especially the question 
from tribunale di Larino)  rised doubts whether it is admissible. The court directly asked 
about compatibility of national law with EC legislation, an issue which should be decided 
by national court. However the court, in accordance with opinion of advocate general, de-
cided that here is nothing to prevent it from giving an answer of use to the national court by 
providing the latter with the guidance as to the interpretation of Community law necessary 
to enable that court to rule on the compatibility of those national rules with Community 
law. See para. 86 of the judgement.
41 See paras. 41-49 of the decisions
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national legislation   as were described by inquiring courts. These four ele-
ments were abstracted from the referred questions:
• the obligation to obtain a licence;
• a method of awarding those licences, by means of a tender proced-
ure excluding certain types of operator;
• the obligation to obtain a police authorization; and
• criminal penalties for failure to comply with the legislation at issue.
4.2.2. AD: THE OBLIGATION TO OBTAIN A LICENCE
As was ruled in Gambelli the Italian licensing scheme posed restrictions on 
fundamental freedoms of common market, but it can be justified if four con-
ditions set forth by the European court of justice are met.  That means that 
existence of licensing scheme is not objectionable per se. The ECJ subscribed 
to this point of view by recognizing that licensing system may constitute an 
efficient  mechanism enabling operators active in  the betting and gaming 
sector to be controlled with a view to preventing the exploitation of those 
activities for criminal or fraudulent purposes42. The court also pointed out 
that not only the mere existence of licensing scheme that limits the number 
of licence holders has to be justified (as Corte suprema di cassazione ruled it 
is, due to public order and safety reasons) but also the limit itself must meet 
conditions given in Gambelli43.  In conformity with previous decisions the 
ECJ let national courts to rule on whether the number of permitted licences 
(1000) could meet the criteria set forth in Gambelli. These conclusions were 
also reflected in first two paragraphs of the ruling:
1. National legislation which prohibits the pursuit of the activities of collect-
ing,  taking,  booking  and forwarding  offers  of  bets,  in  particular  bets  on  
sporting events, without a licence or a police authorization issued by the  
Member State concerned, constitutes a restriction on the freedom of estab-
lishment and the freedom to provide services, provided for in Articles 43 EC  
and 49 EC respectively.
2. It is for the national courts to determine whether, in so far as national le-
gislation limits the number of operators active in the betting and gaming  
sector, it genuinely contributes to the objective of preventing the exploita-
tion of activities in that sector for criminal or fraudulent purposes.
42 See Placanica para
43 See Placanica para
2010] M. Koščík: The Gambling on Internet 143
This part of the Court decision did not truly bring any fresh air into the leg-
al problem, since it only summarized what was already said in the previous 
case laws and in the end came “back to the beginning” by letting national 
court  to  decide  on  justifiability  of  the  national  measures.  Moreover,  the 
needlessness of these conclusions can be objected, since the questions of the 
national court did not contain the issue of compatibility of licences per se, 
but rather the compatibility of criminal prosecution of entrepreneurs who 
do not hold these licences.
4.2.3. AD: THE METHOD OF AWARDING LICENCES
As was already ruled in Gambelli, the exclusion of capital companies from 
the tender procedures created restrictions on freedom of establishment. This 
restriction cannot be justified since the exclusion of capital companies goes 
beyond what is necessary to combat criminal and fraudulent activities in the 
betting industry. Italian government quietly consented with this stance by 
revoking the rule which excluded capital companies from tenders. Never-
theless, this step of Italian government created a challenging question to be 
resolved by ECJ. The question to be answered was, whether a national reg-
ulation could pose a restriction even after it ceased to be valid.
The arguments for stating that even abolished provisions create restric-
tion to freedom of establishment seem to be clear. Even if the disputed pro-
vision is no longer valid, the results of its application are persisting and cre-
ating obstacle in entering Italian market for certain group of entities.  The 
European court of justice supported this view by stating, that it should be 
noted that the question of the lawfulness of the conditions imposed in the 
context of the 1999 tender procedures is far from having been made redund-
ant by the legislative amendments introduced in 200244. Ultimately, the ECJ 
decided that:
1. Articles 43 EC and 49 EC must be interpreted as precluding national le-
gislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which excludes  -  
and, moreover, continues to exclude - from the betting and gaming sector  
operators in the form of companies whose shares are quoted on the regulated  
markets.
ECJ hinted that in such situation, the most suitable solution is to revoke old 
licences and redistribute licences anew. The court also touched the fourth 
point when it noted that if operators cannot be sanctioned for not having a 
licence if they had been unlawfully prevented from receiving them.  There 
44 Ibid. Para. 60
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is however a rather surprising point in the reasoning of the ECJ. In Gambelli 
it was reluctant to rule on compatibility or incompatibility of national provi-
sions  and  ruled  that  such  decision  is  to  be  made  by  national  court.  In 
Placanica, it did not hesitate to rule that the same regulation was precluded 
by articles 43 and 49 of the Treaty.
4.2.4. AD: POLICE AUTHORIZATION AND CRIMINAL PENALTIES
The situation on police authorizations of operators was similar to situation 
on licences and also the courts ruling on this issue had the same outcome. 
Operators were willing to register for police authorizations and also were 
willing to become subjects of police control, however, police refused to is-
sue authorization because it  could be issued only to licence holders. The 
court pointed out that  the lack of a police authorization cannot, in any case, 
be a valid ground for complaint against people who were unable to obtain 
them contrary to EU law.45
5. B-WIN CASE
The Bwin case is the most recent ECJ case on internet gambling. The most 
interesting thing on this case is that it involved cross border provision of 
services purely via internet,  i.e.  without  any physical  presence of service 
provider in the national market.
The case had its origins in Portugal, where the gambling industry was by 
law exclusively  operated by a state owned company named Santa Casa. 
Santa Casa has the legal monopoly on providing gambling services via the 
Internet. The Portuguese laws prevent any other business entity from run-
ning any gambling business and sanction undertakings that promote, or-
ganize  or  operate  gambling  games.46 B-win  ignored this  prohibition  and 
concluded a sponsorship agreement with Portuguese first football division, 
which was subsequently named “Liga betandwin.com”. Both parties to this 
agreement were hence fined by the aggregate fine of 150 000 EUR. Both 
parties appealed to the Portuguese court, which asked ECJ to rule on the 
preliminary question, whether it is contrary to Community law, in particu-
lar to the above-mentioned principles,  for rules of  domestic  law such as 
those at issue in the main proceedings first to grant exclusive rights in fa-
vour of a single body for the operation of lotteries and off-course betting 
and then to extend those exclusive rights to “the entire national territory, in-
cluding … the internet.47
45 Ibid para 67
46 See B-Win -Para. 10
47 Ibid Para. 28.
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After finding that Portuguese laws created an obstacle to free movement 
of services, the ECJ applied the Gambelli test to find out whether they can 
be  justified.  Unlike  in  previous  gambling  cases  where  states  regulated 
gambling to limit the impact of gambling on the society, the Portuguese reg-
ulation followed the objective of fight against crime or consumer protection 
from fraud. The Portugal managed to persuade ECJ that the way Santa Casa 
operates is an appropriate way to fight against crime and consumer protec-
tion. Santa Casa was under the government's control and that this model of 
gambling regulation has been efficient in Portugal since eighteenth century. 
The  court  also  acknowledged that  the  specificities  of  internet  gambling, 
namely the fact that there is no physical contact between consumer and the 
provider, can create higher risk of fraud. Hence the strict Portuguese regu-
lation was found proportionate to the pursued objective of the regulation.
Despite the fact that the member state succeeded in justifying the restric-
tion on free movement of services, the approach of the ECJ cannot be com-
pared as “hands off” approach in cases prior to Gambelli. The court made 
rather detailed examination of the national laws and applied the same test 
as in the case of Gambelli.
6. CONCLUSION
It can be concluded that Gambelli and Placanica had set a clear trend of nar-
rowing the discretion of member states in gambling regulation in the case 
law of both ECJ court case-law. The ECJ has abandoned his rather cautious 
approach in limiting state sovereignty and drawn a border lines which can-
not be crossed by state regulations.
After Gambelli every government of a member state had to reconsider, 
whether it can justify its legislation in the light of proportionality, suitabil-
ity, non discrimination and the objects of legislation. Gambelli also made it 
clear, that financial  interests of the state cannot be considered as general 
public  interest,  which  can  justify  restriction  of  fundamental  freedoms of 
common market. This conclusion seems to be the only possible solution to 
protect free common market, however can bring a certain amount of dis-
honesty in lawmaking process, because it dictates states to pretend they are 
not aware of financial benefits of state regulation.
Placanica narrowed the scope of states discretion even further when it 
accented consistency of measures with the objectives of regulation.  After 
Placanica, member states must be even more aware of the fact, that mere ex-
istence of general public interest cannot “free their hands” to unlimited reg-
ulation, and that every element of the regulation must be considered separ-
ately under Gambelli test.
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The four steps of this test are summarized in this table:
The existence of general interest (objective pursued)
Rules  achieving  such  interest  must  be  applicable  without  distinction 
between national and foreign service providers.
Measure must be appropriate for achieving objective (general interest)
The restrictions must not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the ob-
jective
This  test  was  subsequently  applied  not  only  in  the  cases  before  the 
European court of justice (Such as Bwin case), but was adopted also by the 
EFTA court in “gambling cases” of Ladbrokes Ltd48 or in the EFTA surveil-
lance authority v. Norway,49
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